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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVERSIFICATION 
AND FIRM’S PERFORMANCE: 





Firms’ boundaries have been one of the central questions in several research domains, but, 
despite almost 40 years of research identifying the dark and bright sides of corporate 
diversification, it is possible to affirm that a definitive consensus has not been reached to 
determine whether diversification strategy is positive correlated with firm performance and 
shareholder value or, in other terms, whether a firm has to diversify or needs to remain focused 
on its core activities. Questions about the relation between diversification and firm performance 
arise naturally from the larger problem of determining how firms’ boundaries should be set. 
Coase (1937) argues that boundaries are set at the point at which the costs of carrying out 
transactions within a firm equal those of carrying them out in the open market or in another 
firm. Gains from diversification come from economies of scales (Chandler; 1977) or from 
increased debt capacity (Lewellen 1971) or from exploitation of firm-specific assets in several 
businesses (Wernerfelt and Montgomery; 1988). 
A testament to corporate diversification strategies is the 2006’s M&A
1 wave just before the 2007 
credit crunch, indicating that firms still consider diversification as a path to value creation. 
Moreover, conglomerate firm production represents more than 50 percent of production in the 
United States; hence, understanding the costs and benefits of this form of organization has 
important implications. Much of the recent research on the relationship between diversification 
and firm performance has been developed in the field of strategic management and finance 
with different focus and research questions. 
The finance literature on diversification took off with the discovery of the conglomerate 
discount in the range of 13-15% of firm value (Lag and Stulz, 1994; and Berger and Ofek, 
1995). They focus their research on whether a single segment or a single business firm is better 
off alone or within a conglomerate. Or, in other terms, whether shareholders actually do gain 
from diversification, where gain is measured by the relative value of the diversified firm 
compared to single-segment firm. These papers decomposed conglomerate firms into their 
constituent industry segments and then valued these segments using the “comparables” 
                                              
1 Financial Times, 21/12/2006, “M&A in 2006 beats tech boom”.  
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approach to valuation. They show unambiguously that the value of diversified firms is less than 
the sum of its parts. This result implies that, “on average”, managers of conglomerate firms 
destroy value, and firms are better off if they remain focused on a single business segment: the 
benefits of the relaxation of financial constraints from the internal capital markets are offset by 
greater agency costs than within single segment firms (Jensen, 1986; Berger and Ofek, 1995; 
Denis, Danis and Sarin, 1997; Raian, Servaes and Zingales 2000; Sharfstein and Stain 2000). 
Subsequent research suggests that this relationship is not causal: the discount is attributable to 
factors other than diversification per se (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Graham, Lemmon and Wolf, 
2002; Villalonga, 2004a); in addition, diversified firms follow a neoclassical profit 
maximization model (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002). 
In the field of strategic management, the research question is focused on the identification of 
the type of diversification strategies that lead to superior performance; in other words, whether 
diversification is related or unrelated. In line with the resource-based view of the firm, Palich, 
Cardinal and Miller (2000), studying 55 quantitative studies of the diversification performance 
linkage, confirm that this linkage appears to have an inverted-U curvilinear relationship with 
performance, but the choice of measurement method of diversity or “relatedness” presents 
scholars with a degree of subjectivity (Martin and Sayrak, 2003), and hence with the possibility 
of influencing research results (Hall and John; 1994; Robin and Wieserma, 2003). For example, 
if McDonalds diversified into clothing retail, would diversification be related or unrelated? We 
could consider it related because of the retail business, but unrelated because clothing is not 
food. Moreover, Bergh (1995), Bergh and Holbain (1997), and Bergh (2007) argue that the 
statistical validity of several studies in the relationships between diversification and 
performance could be highly vulnerable to type I statistical errors. This relationship might 
appear positive when data is pooled, averaged or tested in cross-section, but when testing over 
time, controlling for time invariant firm-specific effect and heteroskedasticity, this relationship 
might become insignificant, thus leading to theoretical misinterpretations. 
In this research, similar to Campa and Kedia (2002), Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002), and 
Villalonga (2004a), we argue that the relationship between diversification and shareholder value 
is not causal but attributable to factors other than diversification. We base our research 
assumptions on one of the key fundamental pieces of empirical evidence in industrial 
organization economics and strategic management literature: the existence of persistence of 
abnormal return, defined as a statistically significant above- or below-average performance 
relative to a reference set (such as an industry) that persists over the long term (Mueller, 1977; 
Jacobsen, 1988; Schohl, 1990; Waring, 1996; McGahan and Porter, 1999; Maruyama and Odagiri, 
2002; Wiggins and Ruefly, 2002; McGahan and Porter, 2003; Yurtoglu, 2004; Benzen, Strojer 
Madsen, Valdemart and Dilling-Hansen, 2005; Wiggins and Ruefly, 2005; Kaplan and Schoar, 
2005). In other words, if the competitive advantage (from a specific position in the industry or 
because of strategic assets) had been sustainable only in the short term, it would have triggered a 
serious reconsideration, especially in the field of strategic management science. 
This implies that some diversified firms persistently perform above industry average, while 
others persistently perform below. We find that the persistence of abnormal return explained 
the relationship between diversification and performance although we find evidence of the 
impact on performance according to the degree of efficiency of the internal capital market and 
the degree of unrelatedness of the firm’s business segments. In addition, without arguing the 
statistical validity of the existence of the diversification discount, we believe that looking for a 
diversification discount or premium would be an extremely relevant indicator if the firm’s 
performance did not follow any specific pattern over time. But because of firms’ outstanding  
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performance heterogeneity, finding an average indicator of discount or premium might not 
unambiguously indicate whether diversification is negative for the firm. 
Our contribution can be summarized as follows. In the field of strategic management, our 
findings are much closer to Grant and Jammine (1988) than to Palich, Cardinal and Miller 
(2000). We do not confirm the inverted-U relationship between diversification and performance, 
but rather we find opposite results: diversified firms in the top quintile have business segments 
in different industries. Moreover, we confirm our findings using a longitudinal study with panel 
data through a system GMM in order to control the time invariant firm’s specific effect 
(autocorrelation) as well as controlling for heteroscedasticity (Bergh and Holbain, 1997). We 
also analyze the market risk of diversified firms. Because of the non-normality of the returns’ 
distribution, we use a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model to 
measure the daily conditional volatility or daily total risk. Differing with Lubatkin and 
Chatterjee (1994), we find lower volatility in diversified firms in which the positive abnormal 
return is positively correlated with a number of business segments in several industries 
(subsectors defined at 3 digits NAICS code). 
We contribute to the field of finance by demonstrating that there exists a statistically consistent 
persistence of performance above and below industry average among diversified firms. Hence 
we believe that looking for a diversification discount or premium would be an extremely 
relevant indicator if the firm’s performance does not follow any specific pattern over time. But, 
because of the persistent heterogeneity of abnormal returns, we argue that an average indicator 
of a diversification discount or premium might not unambiguously indicate whether 
diversification has negative results for shareholders, suggesting therefore an additional 
perspective on the relationship between diversification and shareholder value. 
This rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next session we briefly discuss related 
literature in strategic management and in finance. Section II describes the data and the sample 
selection. Section III describes how we calculate the outstanding performance, shows the 
preliminary results, and finally tests the persistence of performance heterogeneity among 
diversified firms using different econometrics techniques and the Markov conditional 
probabilities. Section IV calculates and compares top and bottom quintile firms by the 
following indicators: (i) the shareholder value in terms of return and unconditional risk, (ii) 
Jensen’s alpha, (iii) Fama and French’s three-factor model, and (iv) the conditional risk. Section 
V attempts to explain the persistence of abnormal returns according to the degree of efficiency 
of the internal capital market and according to the degree of relatedness among business 
segments. Within each section, the findings are discussed. Finally, Section VI concludes. 
Section I: review of the literature 
Despite the substantial number of empirical studies in both finance and strategic management, 
research on the relationship between diversification and performance has not yet reached a 
definitive consensus on whether firms are better off remaining focused or diversifying in 
different businesses (Martin and Sayrak, 2003).  
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Strategic management literature 
Most studies in the field of strategic management were centered on the idea that certain types of 
diversification strategies lead to distinctive performance (Rumelt, 1974; Bettis, 1981; Rumelt, 
1982; Palepu, 1985; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988), but in this paper the research question is 
focused on the identification of the diversification strategy, or rather the type of diversification by 
comparing diversified firms. Palich, Cardinal and Miller (2000), studying 55 quantitative studies 
of the diversification performance linkage, confirm that this linkage appears to have an inverted-
U curvilinear relationship with performance, consistent with the theory of the resource-based 
view of the firm. A positive effect occurs as firms move from a single business strategy to a 
related diversification strategy, but negative effects occur as firms move from a related strategy to 
an unrelated strategy in which the benefit of synergies are offset by the cost of diversification. 
The central question here seems to be the choice of measurement method of diversity or 
relatedness that influences research results (Hall and John; 1994; Robin and Wieserma, 2003), and 
the statistical econometrics methodologies used to measure the relationship between 
diversification and firm performance (Bergh, 1995; Bergh and Holbain, 1997; Bergh, 2007), with 
findings highly vulnerable to statistical errors (type I) and, therefore, drawing theoretical 
conclusions not based on solid statistical evidence. Attempts to measure the extent and type of 
firm diversity have followed two main avenues: at one extreme there are simple but objective, 
replicable indicators (e.g., continuous measurement developed from SIC codes, such as the 
Hertfindahl index) but with the shortcoming of not being able to tap fully into the dimension of 
relatedness, and at the other extreme there are more sophisticated indicators that are able to 
represent in more detail the degree of relatedness among business units; their relatedness 
constructs are based on cross-business synergies arising from, for example, product relatedness 
(Rumelt, 1974), manufacturing relatedness (John and Harrison, 1999), technological relatedness 
(Robins and Wiersema, 1995; Silverman, 1999), R&D relatedness (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 
1991), marketing relatedness (Capron and Hulland, 1999), advertising relatedness (Chatterjee and 
Wernerfelt, 1991), managerial relatedness (Ilinitch and Zeithaml, 1995; Prahalad and Bettis, 
1986), human resource relatedness (Farjoun, 1994), and resource-based view relatedness 
(Markides and Williamson, 1994). Robin and Wieserma (2003) raised the issue related to the 
“content validity”
2 of the related diversification indexes, and Tanriverdi and Venkatraman (2005) 
point out the difference between potential relatedness and actual relatedness: potential synergies 
may not be exploited by the firm; hence, when using potential relatedness as a proxy for actual 
relatedness, the interpretation of results might be difficult. 
Finance literature 
In finance literature most of these studies were centered on the research question: is a segment 
of business better off alone or within a conglomerate? Does this enables researchers and 
scholars to determine if “on average” diversification creates or destroys shareholder value? 
Business segments within a conglomerate are supposed to benefit from the internal capital 
market, and the headquarters is considered an effective financial intermediary through “winner 
picking” behavior (Williamson, 1975; Stain, 1997): the business segment benefits from higher 
rights control over the projects, and this allows better information flow, higher asset re-
                                              
2 The authors mention the definition of Zaller and Carmines (1980) that describes the content validity as: 
“fundamentally content validity concerns the extent to which a set of items taps the content of some domain of 
interest. To the degree that the items reflect the full domain of content they are said to be content-valid”.  
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deployability, and relaxation of credit constraints (Gertner, Sharfstein and Stein, 1994). These 
benefits are supposed to offset the internal capital market’s flip-side, identified as the reduction 
of managers’ entrepreneurial incentive, the effort dilution factor and agency argumentation of 
on-the-job consumption (Jensen, 1986), in which projects receive a lower level of funding than 
they could obtain alone because of the cross-subsidization in which good performing divisions 
subsidize poor performing divisions, which destroys shareholder value (Lang and Stulz, 1994; 
Berg and Ofek, 1995; Denis, Danis and Sarin, 1997; Raian, Servaes and Zingales, 2000; 
Sharfstein and Stain, 2000). 
In order to answer that specific question, Lang and Stulz (1994), through a firm’s industry 
adjusted Tobin’s q, and Berg and Ofek (1995), through an excess value methodology, find that 
the value of the diversified firms is, on average, lower than the comparable portfolios of 
specialized firms, finding a diversification discount explained by the inefficiency of the internal 
capital market. They conclude that diversification is not a successful path to higher 
performance because the value of the diversified firm is less than the sum of its parts by an 
average discount factor of 13-15% (Berg and Ofek, 1995). Moreover, complementary evidence 
about the valuation of conglomerate firms is provided by Comment and Jarrell (1995): firms 
that increase in focus, subsequent to asset sales, increase in value. The portfolio method of 
specialized firms, or “pure play firms” (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berg and Ofek, 1995), suffers 
from several drawbacks including sample selection (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004a), 
measurement errors, and data artifacts (Graham, Lemmon and Wolf, 2002; Schoar, 2002; Mansi 
and Reeb, 2002; Villalonga, 2004b; Emms and Kale, 2006; Stowe and Xing, 2006). Once these 
biases are corrected, the diversification discount becomes very small or even turns into a 
premium. Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004a) find that the diversification discount 
was explained by endogeneity (diversifying firms are poor performers prior to conglomeration) 
and, once the endogeneity was corrected, they found empirical evidence that diversification 
might be a value-enhancing strategy. Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) and Emms and Kale 
(2006) found that target firms were already discounted firms, hence the comparison between 
divisions of conglomerate and stand-alone firms overestimates the magnitude of the 
diversification discount. Mansi and Reeb (2002) argue that measurements of the firm’s value 
based on book value of debt would systematically undervalue diversified firms, and Stowe and 
Xing (2006), using the excess value methodology, find that part of the diversification discount 
was explained by controlling the firm’s growth opportunities, concluding that growth 
opportunities might account for at least one part of the diversification discount. Villalonga 
(2004), using excess value methodology, finds that the diversification discount was due to a 
data artifact (over-evaluation of the assets and sales industry multiples). Using industry case 
studies and econometric analyses, Khanna and Tice (2001), Campello (2002), and Guedj and 
Scharfstein (2004) identify several specific advantages of internal capital markets. Finally 
Santalo and Becerra (2008) show that the effect of diversification on performance is not 
homogeneous across industries: diversified firms perform better in industries with a small 
number of non-diversified competitors. 
To summarize, in both fields of research there is no strong consensus (i) whether a business 
segment is better off within a diversified firm or standing alone, or (ii) what type of 
diversification strategies increase a firm’s performance. But on the other hand, they have 
highlighted consistent and specific performance characteristics of diversified firms. 
On the positive side, diversified firms benefit more than single segment firms from an efficient 
internal capital market (Williamson, 1975; Shin and Stulz, 1988; Stain, 1997) and from cheaper 
access to the external source of funds (Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Mansi and Reeb, 2006; Peyer,  
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2002), especially in situations of higher information asymmetry between the corporate 
headquarters and the external capital market (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Khanna and Tice, 
2002; Campello, 2002; Guedji and Scharfstein, 2004; Hyland and Diltz, 2002). In addition, 
diversified firms follow a neoclassic value maximization model, searching for new growth 
opportunities (Goold and Campbell, 1987; Chandler, 1991; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Maksimovic 
and Phillips, 2002; Schoar, 2002; Stowe and Xinx, 2006), maximizing synergies across the 
business (Palich, Cardinal and Miller, 2000), acquiring poor performing firms (Graham, Lemmon 
and Wolf, 2002; Emms and Kale, 2006), and improving the productivity of target companies 
through higher management capabilities (Schoar, 2002). 
On the negative side of diversification, empirical findings have shown its drawbacks (in term of 
value destruction), especially driven by agency arguments that divert funds from their best uses 
(Jensen, 1986; Denis, Danis and Sarin, 1997; Sharfstein and Stain, 2000; Raian, Servaes and 
Zingales, 2000; Hyland and Dilz, 2002), by the development of business segments lacking in 
potential synergies (Palich, Cardinal and Miller, 2000) or because the firm is too big and 
becomes unmanageable (Stain, 1997). 
Section II: data and sample selection 
The sample includes diversified firms available from Compustat’s North America Industrial 
Annual file and Compustat’s Segments file. The Compustat’s Segments file is used to retrieve data 
on a firm’s business segments, while the Compustat’s North America Industrial Annual file is used 
to ensure the integrity of the segment data using the Berger and Ofek’s (1995) convention. 
The new segment reporting standard SFAS 131 was issued by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Boards (FASB) in June 1997 and is effective for fiscal years commencing after 
December 15, 1997. According to the SFAS 131, a firm needs to report disaggregated 
information by line of business unless they organize themselves that way for purposes of 
performance evaluation. In addition, the information provided under the new standard about 
segment definition would be less subjective than what was provided under the previous SFAS 
14 and it induces companies to more fully reveal their diversification and fund transfer 
strategies, hence reflecting any underlying agency problem (Berger and Hann, 2003). 
Because a firm’s size directly influences stock returns (Fama and French, 1995), we attempt to 
control for the “size effect” by introducing a minimum sample limit of $500 million turnover and 
removing all firms that fall below this threshold. The resulting sample comprises 317 diversified 
firms, representing 42% of the population of diversified firms with a turnover higher than $500 
million, taken from Compustat Industry Segment (CIS) during the period 1999-2006 is examined. 
Because our research is based on the empirical evidence of the persistence of “abnormal 
returns” within diversified firms, we collect data only from firms that remain diversified during 
the entire time series. In addition, testing the persistence of abnormal returns requires balanced 
panel data; thus, firms missing one or more years of data cannot be included in the sample. 
Although we had to exclude a certain number of firms, we were able to retain 42% of the 
population of diversified firms, which allowed us to generalize our findings to the entire 
population of diversified and single-segment firms. With this study method, we have introduced 
a survival bias in our sample (i.e., we exclude diversified firms that either refocus to improve 
performance or are bought).  
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The length of this time series (8 years) is justified by the aim of the research question: to 
compare diversified and single-segment firms that retain their status during the entire time 
period. A longer time series (e.g., 15-20 years), as used in previous studies, may increase the 
self-selection bias effect, especially for diversified firms, given that poor-performing diversified 
firms may choose to refocus on one business in order to improve performance (Wernerfelt and 
Montgomery, 1988; Comment and Jarrel, 1995), leaving only high-performing diversified firms 
in the sample. Moreover, the requirement related to the use of balanced panel data shortens the 
time series: a longer time series would have caused difficulties in generalizing our empirical 
findings, as it would have led to more companies being excluded due to missing data. 
To enable a comparison with previous studies in finance, firms belonging to agriculture (SIC 100-
900), regulated industries (SIC 4900-4999), financial services (SIC 6000-6900), depositary receipts 
(SIC 8888), international affairs (SIC 9721), and non-operating establishments (SIC 9995), are 
excluded. Diversified firms do not always fully allocate accounting items in their reported 
business segments, and this lack of consistency in reporting may lead to problems with the use of 
business segment data. Therefore, we have adopted Berger and Ofek’s (1995) convention of 
requiring that the sum of segment sales (assets) be within 1% (25%) of the consolidated firm total 
reported in Compustat’s North America Industrial Annual file. For those firms that meet these 
criteria, any unallocated assets are explicitly allocated to it; for example, if a firm’s asset level is 
10% smaller (larger) than the sum of the segment assets, each segment’s assets are reduced 
(increased) by 10%. Moreover, the corporate segment data (sales, assets, capital expenditure, 
operating income and depreciation) are allocated to the segments on an asset-weighted basis. 
These adjustments should mitigate the shortcomings highlighted by Berger and Hann (2003) in 
the use of SFAS 131. Firms that have segments in the financial industry or in a regulated industry 
are not excluded; rather, just that particular segment is excluded from the analysis. Around 37 
firms in the sample have activities in the financial industry. Most of the time this financial 
segment is represented by leasing activities and, given the interest spread between diversified 
firms’ cost of debt and the final lending interest, it is assumed that this activity is profitable. 
Hence, excluding these types of firms may introduce a bias in the sample selection, given that 
diversified firms enjoy greater debt capacity, lower cost of debt, and debt tax shield relative to 
single-segment firms due to lower risk (Lewellen, 1971; Mansi and Reeb, 2002). 
Section III: identification of performance measurements and test 
of persistence of outstanding performance 
3.1. Variables 
In order to measure the persistence of superior performance, defined as an above- or below-
average return relative to a reference set, the performance indicator we used here is the 
“abnormal return” or “outstanding performance”. This indicator of a firm’s performance 
indicates whether the firm performs above or below its industry average. The average is 
calculated using data from all firms operating in that particular industry, whether they were 
single-segment and diversified firms. This implies that this indicator might take a positive or 
negative value, depending on whether the firm performs above or below its industry average. 
Because diversified firms operate in more than one industry, the outstanding performance is 
simply the sum of the asset-weighted averages of the performance of its segments relative to 
the industry average. We consider that this indicator of outstanding performance (or  
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performance relative to the industry average) controls for industry effects and, hence, it allows 
us to identify, rank, and compare which firms belong to the top and bottom performer quintiles 
from different industries with different levels of performance. 
We identify three indicators of outstanding performance, OROA, OSALES/ASSETS and 
OOP/SALES, that measure performance in the return on assets, return on sales, and operating 
profits/sales ratio relative to industry averages, respectively: 
(i) OROAit = 
where ROAjit  represents the ROA of the industry j defined by a 6-digit NAICS code of the 
segment of firm i during period t and ROAindjt represents the asset-weighted average ROA of the 
same industry j during period t. Ajit /Ait represents the portion of the assets of segment j within 
firm i during period t. In order to calculate a consistent industry benchmark (ROAindjt), we 
follow the methodology in the financial literature on the diversification discount used to 
construct industry multiples (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berg and Ofek, 1995). At least 5 segments 
are required with the same industry defined by a 6-digit NAICS code. If this condition is not 
fulfilled, the industry is then defined by a 5-digit NAICS code and then by a 4-digit NAICS code 
until this condition is fulfilled. 
The other two indicators of outstanding performance -the sales to total assets ratio and the 
return on sales (ROS) ratio- are constructed by applying the same logic as OROAit: 
(ii) OSALES/ASSETSit = 
where SALESindjt/ASSETSindjt represents the asset-weighted average total assets to sales ratio of 
the same industry j during period t. 
(iii) OROSit = 
where ROSindjt represents the asset-weighted average operating profit/sales ROS ratio of the 
same industry j during period t. 
Table I summarizes the descriptive statistics of the three outstanding performance indicators of 
diversified firms. On average, diversified firms slightly underperform their industry sectors for 
all three indicators of outstanding performance. However, the standard deviation indicates that 
there is a substantial dispersion around averages values, making these values not the strongest 
indicators for studying the relationship between diversification and performance. 
Table I 
Descriptive statistics of performance indicators of diversified firms 
Three measures of outstanding performance are developed: outstanding ROA (OROA), 
outstanding SALES/ASSETS and outstanding Operating Profit/Sales (OROS). They enable to 
compare the performance of diversified firms in different industries assessing whether the firm 
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  Mean Med  σ Max  Min 
Assets 8225  1905  21526  265680  779 
Outstanding ROA (ROA)  -0.01  -0.01  0.08  0.73  -0.95 
Outstanding SALES/ASSETS  -0.03  -0.09  0.87  20.12  -4.62 
Outstanding ROS (OROS)  -0.01  0.00  0.43  3.89  -16.84 
3.2. Test of persistent performance 
To test persistence of outstanding performance, first we used an autoregressive model AR (1) 
such as: 
Yit = α + βYi(t-1) + (ηi + vit) 
The test was carried out using several econometric techniques. Yit is the observation of the 
outstanding performance indicators of firm i in period t, Yi(t-1) is the outstanding performance of 
the previous period, ηi is the stochastic unobserved firm-specific time-invariant effect, vit is the 
error component and α is the constant term. The value of β  is estimated using different 
econometric measurements and the Hausman test (null hypothesis E[Yitηi] = 0) is performed. 
Table II 
Autoregressive model AR(1) of persistence of outstanding performance 
To test the persistence of outstanding performance, an autoregressive model AR(1) such as: Yit 
= α + βYi(t-1) + (ηi + vit) is used to determine, applying various econometric techniques, the value 
of the autoregressive coefficient β: pooled OLS, Within-Group and the instrumental variables 
(IV) 2SLS. To select the most efficient econometric model, the Hausman test (null hypothesis 
E[Yitηi] = 0) is used to assess the presence of firm’s time-invariant specific effect ηi. The 
Hausman test indicates whether the Pooled OLS provides a consistent estimate of β. In brackets 
are indicated the t value of the coefficient. 
  Pooled OLS  Within-group  IV 2SLS 







2  0.48 0.4553   
Hausman test  χ2= 310.20* 







2  0.7661 0.1967   
Hausman test  χ2 = 151.83* 







2  0.0913 0.0568   
Hausman test  χ2= 219.78* 
* p< 0.001 
Table II shows that all the autoregressive models AR(1) give a consistent positive value of β that 
confirms the hypothesis of a persistent outstanding performance for all three outstanding 
performance indicators: OROA with a range between 0.69-0.21, OSALES/ASSETS with a range 
0.81-0.42 and a OROS with a range 0.30-0.056. This means that firms that achieved above 
industry average performance continued to do so during our time series, and, conversely, firms 
that achieved below industry average performance continued to do so during our time series.  
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For all three indicators of outstanding performance, the Hausman test rejects the null 
hypothesis, hence the pooled OLS is rejected and the persistence of performance is computed 
through the WG indicator and the Two-Stages Least Squared (2SLS). As suggested by Bond 
(2002) and Arellano (2003), AR(1) through pooled OLS is inconsistent and biased upwards since 
the explanatory variable Yit-1 is positively correlated with the error term (ηi + vit) due to the 
presence of the firm time-invariant specific effect ηi. The Within-Group estimator eliminates the 
sources of inconsistency by transforming the equation to eliminate the firm time-invariant 
specific effect ηi. However, this transformation introduces a negative correlation of order 1/(t-1) 
between the transformed lagged dependent variables and the transformed error term, suggesting 
that, except for time series with t greater than or equal to 15 (Arellano, 2003), the Within-
Group estimator is biased downwards and therefore is not efficient. The correlation between Yit 
and ηi indicates that the consistent estimation of β is represented only by model 3 through the 
autoregressive first difference Two-Stage Least Squared (2SLS) developed by Anderson and 
Hsiao (1981), in which the firm-specific effects are eliminated and, hence, the estimator is 
consistent. For the entire sample and for both single-segment and diversified firms, we find 
strong empirical evidence of consistent, outstanding performance between time t and time t-1. 
3.3. Composition of diversified firms’ portfolio 
The value of the autoregressive coefficient β confirms the existence of a persistent outstanding 
performance. Due to this empirical evidence, we compare the difference in shareholder value 
between portfolio of top and bottom performers, as follow: firms are ranked according to their 
outstanding performance indicators for every year, classes of quintiles are formed and the 
Markov conditional probability of remaining in the same quintile from time t to t+1 during the 
times series 1999-2006 is calculated. The null hypothesis (absence of persistent outstanding 
performance) would assume equal probability, around 20%, of remaining in the same quintile 
or migrating to one of the other four quintiles. Our results show a persistently outstanding 
performance for all three indicators. 
Table III 
Markov conditional probability 
An additional measurement of the persistence of outstanding performance is the conditional 
Markov probabilities. For all indicators of outstanding performance, and during each year of 
the time series 1999- 2006, all firms are sorted into performance quintiles and the Markov 
conditional probability that indicates that a firm will either stay in the same performance 
quintile, or move into one of the other four quintiles in the following year (t+1) is determined. 
For the hypothesis H0 (absence of persistence of outstanding performance), the Markov 
conditional probabilities would have been around 20%, which indicates that at time (t+1) a 
firm has the same probability of staying in the same quintile as it does of moving into one of 
the lower or upper quintiles. For the hypothesis H1 (existence of a persistence of outstanding 
performance between time t and time t+1), the value of the Markov conditional probability 
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Diversified Firms 
Outstanding ROA (OROA) 
  Top Quintile (%)  II Quintile (%)  III Quintile (%)  IV Quintile (%)  Bottom Quintile (%) 
Top Quintile  63  20  8  3  5 
II Quintile  21  40  23  10  6 
III Quintile  8  26  32  23  10 
IV Quintile  3  9  26  40  22 
Bottom Quintile  4  5  12  26  52 
Outstanding OSALES/ASSETS 
  Top Quintile (%)  II Quintile (%)  III Quintile (%)  IV Quintile (%)  Bottom Quintile (%) 
Top Quintile  73  17  5  1  4 
II Quintile  19  45  24  8  4 
III Quintile  4  26  42  23  4 
IV Quintile  4  9  23  47  17 
Bottom Quintile  2  3  8  21  65 
Outstanding OROS 
  Top Quintile (%)  II Quintile (%)  III Quintile (%)  IV Quintile (%)  Bottom Quintile (%) 
Top Quintile  62  17  7  8  5 
II Quintile  22  42  22  8  6 
III Quintile  5  23  40  22  9 
IV Quintile  4  10  24  42  20 
Bottom Quintile  7  6  10  21  56 
 
The null hypothesis is rejected for all three performance indicators: diversified firms in the top 
(and bottom) quintile have at least a 52% chance of remaining in those quintiles and at most a 
7% chance of moving to the bottom (and top) quintile. Our results are consistent with Mueller 
(1977), firms starting out with the highest and lowest profitability levels have a greater than 
expected probability of remaining in their initial grouping. Conversely, firms in the center of 
the distribution have a greater than expected probability of movement out of the center. For 
example, for the indicator outstanding ROA (OROA), the probability of the top and bottom 
quintiles remaining in their quintile is 63% and 52%, respectively, while for the second, third 
and fourth quintiles, this percentage is 40%, 32% and 40%, respectively. This also suggests that 
differing convergence process patterns out of the initial grouping is much more likely for firms 
starting nearer the center than firms starting nearer the distribution tails. 
We find similar figures for the two indicators of outstanding performance. The Markov 
conditional probabilities confirmed the previous findings using econometric techniques: we find 
a significant persistence of outstanding performance for all performance indicators. Firms that 
outperform during time t have a high probability of outperforming during time t+1 and firms 
that underperform during time t have a high probability of underperforming during time t+1. 
This empirical evidence provides the basis for our research. This also strengthens our argument 
that, when studying the relationship between diversification and performance, the use of 
average indicators (i.e., the diversification discount) should also be considered in conjunction 
with the evidence of the persistence of outstanding performance. 
We use this finding of persistent outstanding performance to find empirical evidence that the 
relationship diversification and performance is not causal: we estimate and compare 
shareholder value and market performance between top and bottom quintiles of diversified 
firms. We form equally weighted portfolios (one portfolio contains shares of the firms 
belonging to the top quintile and the other portfolio contains shares of the firms belonging to  
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the bottom quintile), based on the ranking obtained from the OROA performance indicator. We 
selected the OROA indicator instead of the other two indicators of outstanding performance 
(OSALES/ASSETS and OROS) because of its higher correlation against a firm’s Tobin’s q, this 
last being considered as an index of corporate performance; see Table IV. 
Table IV 
Simple regression among outstanding performance variables and Tobin’s q 
Table III shows that for all three indicators of performance the Markov conditional probability 
shows strong empirical evidence. In order to select the more appropriate performance indicators 
to construct portfolios of top and lower quintiles, each indicator is regressed against the Tobin’s 
q in comparison to the other two indicators OSALES/ASSETS and OOP/SALES. The following 
table shows that the OROA has a higher correlation wit h the Tobin’s q, hence the portfolios of 
top and lower diversified firms will be built according to the ranking on the OROA indicators. 
 OSALES/ASSETS  OOP/SALES  OROA  Tobin’s  q ROA 
OSALES/ASSETS 1         
OOP/SALES 0,0028  1       
OROA 0,1352  0,0646  1     
Tobin’s q 0,0284  0,0127  0,2248  1   
ROA 0,0878  0,042  0,6504  0,3379  1 
Section IV: shareholder value, market performance and risk for 
single-segment and diversified firms 
Using empirical evidence on the persistence of outstanding performance, we can calculate and 
compare shareholder value through the market performance of equal-valued share portfolios of 
the top and bottom quintile of diversified firms. We compare shareholder value between top 
and bottom by (i) comparing the market performance computing the returns, the unconditional 
risk (σ), and the Jensen’s alpha, and (ii) regressing the portfolio return against the asset pricing 
model of Fama and French, and computing the daily conditional risk (conditional σ). We 
perform this analysis for every year and for each portfolio of top and bottom quintiles in order 
to confirm that the persistence of outstanding performance found at accounting data level is 
also reflected at market data level. For every year, two equally weighted portfolios are 
constructed and the shareholder return is evaluated. As previously explained, the portfolios are 
constructed according to the ranking of the OROA indicator of outstanding performance: the 
first portfolio with firms that belong to the top quintile of diversified firms and the second 
portfolio with firms that belong to the bottom quintile of diversified firms. 
4.1. Risk and total return 
For each portfolio and for every year, the portfolio’s total return and standard deviation (σ), as 
a measure of unconditional volatility, are calculated. Table V shows the results. During the 
entire time series, we find that the top quintile portfolio reached a statistically significant 
higher performance than the bottom quintile portfolio, either with equal return and lower 
volatility or with higher return and equal volatility, while in 3 out of 8 years top quintiles 
outperform the bottom quintiles on both return and volatility.  
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Table V 
Shareholder value of top and bottom quintiles of diversified and single-segment firms: total return, 
and standard deviation 
Daily market data, for each year and for each portfolio of top and bottom quintiles of 
diversified firms, are used to calculate the total return and the total unconditional risk (the 
standard deviation σ). Daily market data are taken from Thomson Financial and the total return 
has been taken into consideration. Panel A shows the yearly return and conditional risk for the 
two portfolios: top quintile diversified firms, and bottom quintile diversified firms. Panel B 
shows the difference in yearly returns and its statistical significance at 95% (t statistics 
indicated in brackets), and the difference in unconditional risk and the statistical significance (p 
value) of the inequality of the standard deviations (σ). The difference is calculated between 
portfolios of different quintiles (top quintile compared with bottom quintile). 
Panel A 
Top quintile diversified firms (%) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004 2005 2006 
Return 16.06  11.97  11.82  -6.76  37.53  23.07  14.65  19.60 
Unconditional risk (σ)  11.23 17.98 16.14 16.96  13.18  10.55  12.55 14.61 
Bottom quintile diversified firms (%) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004 2005 2006 
Return 2.41  -13.67  -0.27  -26.64  40.11  12.75  -8.11  11.64 
Unconditional risk (σ)  12.56 16.39 19.18 22.59  16.96  14.37  13.36 14.86 
 
Panel B 
Difference in return and risk between top and bottom quintile of diversified firms (%) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005 2006 

















Unconditional risk (σ) 
-1.33 1.59  -3.04 -5.63*  -3.78***  -3.82**  -0.81 -0.25 
*p< 0.01, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.10. 
4.2. Jensen’s alpha 
Jensen’s alpha (Jensen, 1969) measures the systematic risk-adjusted excess return with respect 
to a selected reference market according to the formula: 
Rp – Rf= βp (Rm-Rf) + Alpha 
Αlpha = Rp – βp (Rm-Rf) - Rf 
Rp represents the return of the top and bottom quintile portfolios, Rf is the risk-free rate, Rm is 
the market return and βp is the covariance of the portfolio’s returns scaled by the variance of 
the return on the market. 
Jensen’s alpha is calculated according to the S&P 500 Composite; the data are taken on a daily 
basis.  
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Table VI 
Jensen’s alpha of the top and bottom quintiles in diversified and single-segment firms 
Daily market data, for each year and for each portfolio of top and bottom quintiles of 
diversified and single-segment firms, are used to calculate Jensen’s alpha in order to compare 
the financial performance with a market reference. Daily market data are taken from Thomson 
Financial and the total return has been taken into consideration. Jensen’s alpha is calculated 
according to the following formula: Αlpha = Rp – βp (Rm-Rf) – Rf, where Rp represents the return 
of the top and bottom quintile portfolio, Rf is the risk-free rate, Rm is the market return and βp is 
the covariance of the portfolio’s returns scaled by the variance of the market return. The S&P 
500 Composite index has been taken as reference market (market index). The correlation R
2 
between the market index and the portfolio is shown in brackets. 
Top quintile diversified firms (%) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 
















Bottom quintile diversified firms (%) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 

















From Table VI it is possible to conclude that the difference and persistence of performance 
found in section 1 is reflected as well at shareholder value level. The Jensen’s alpha difference 
between the top quintile portfolio and the bottom quintile portfolio is always positive. 
Comparing the performance of the two portfolios with the market performance through 
Jensen’s alpha, the top quintile portfolio consistently beat the market index during the entire 
time series, while the bottom quintile portfolio underperformed the market index (negative 
value of α) during 4 years over the period. 
4.3. Fama and French’s three-factor model 
To discover the top and bottom quintile firm characteristics, especially in terms of the degree of 
business relatedness of the firm’s business portfolio and on the ability of the firm to position its 
business portfolio within an industry with growth opportunities, for every year of the time series 
each portfolio is regressed against Fama and French’s asset pricing model to explain the 
portfolio’s extra return (the portfolio’s return minus the risk-free rate), taking into account the 
extra return or “risk premium” that investors ask for with respect to a “size premium” and “value 
premium”, in addition to the premium related to the systematic risk. This multifactor model was 
motivated by the empirical finding that the size (SMB) and ratio of book to market equity (HML) 
have consistent and significant explanatory power of stock returns (Fama and French 1992). 
The Fama and French three factor model follows this formula: 
Rp = Rf + bi(Rm-Rf) + siSMB +hiHML 
with:  
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Factor Rm-Rf: market premium, equal to the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964). This measurement allows 
comparing, for both portfolios, the systematic risk known as the market risk or the risk that 
cannot be diversified away; not specific to individual stock. 
Factor SMB (Small Minus Big) accounts for “size premium” and conditionally it is also related 
to profitability (Fama and French, 1992). It is designed to measure the additional return that 
investors have historically received by investing in stocks of companies with relatively small 
market capitalization. Logically, this factor should be expected to be more sensitive to many 
risk factors as a result of their relatively undiversified nature and their reduced ability to absorb 
negative financial stock. Fama and French (1992) notice that the recession of 1981 and 1982 
turned into a prolonged earning depression for small stocks and they notice that, for some 
reason, on average, small stocks did not participate in the boom of the middle and late 1980s. 
Through this factor we aim to gain insight into the nature of the degree of relatedness of 
business segment with diversified firms. From the construction of the sample, taking into 
consideration firms with a turnover greater than $500 million, we assume that firms with a 
highly related business (or business segment with high correlation among the cash flow among 
of its business segments) might be considered to have risk exposure to many risk factors as a 
result of their relatively poor diversification strategy and, hence, difficulty in absorbing 
negative financial stock; in other words, the correlation among business segments’ cash flow 
can be considered as an indirect indicator of relatedness among business segments. 
Factor HML (High Minus Low) accounts for “value premium” and is more related to profitability 
than the SMB factor (Fama and French, 1992). It is designed to measure the additional return 
provided to investors for investing in companies with high book-to-market values. Fama and 
French (1995) show that book-to-market equity and the slope on HML proxy of distress: weak 
firms with persistently low earnings tend to have high BE/ME (book equity/market equity) ratio 
and a positive slope on HMT, while strong firms with persistently high earnings have low 
BE/ME and a negative slope to HML. Through this factor we aim to gain an insight into the 
ability of the diversified firm to position its business portfolio within industries with growth 
opportunities, rather than focus on industries with lower growth opportunities. 
Table VII shows the results. 
Table VII 
Regression of top and bottom quintile returns against the Fama and French three-factor model 
The daily return of the top and bottom quintile portfolios of diversified and single-segment 
firms is regressed against the Fama and French three-factor model according to the formula 
(Rp-Rf) = α + bi(Rm-Rf) + siSMB +hiHML. Rm is the return on the value-weighted index of NYSE, 
Amex, and Nasdaq stocks on day t; Rft is the beginning-of-month three-month T-bill yield on 
day t, SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return on large firms on day t, and HMLt is 
the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks on 
day t. The factor definitions are described in Fama et al. (1993). 
The regression is performed for every year and for the entire time series 1999-2006. T-statistics 
are in brackets. Panel A contains the results of the regressions for the top quintiles. Panel B 
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Panel A: Top Quintiles 
Top quintile diversified firms (yearly) 
Coefficients  1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
R













































































Panel B: Bottom Quintiles 
Bottom quintile diversified firms (yearly) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005 2006 
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In Panel A, we analyze the top quintile portfolios and in panel B the bottom quintile. For both 
panels, the yearly regression suggests high value and statistical significance in the regression 
coefficients with an intercept statistically indistinguishable from zero except for 2004 and 2005 
for diversified firms, but economically indistinguishable from zero for the entire time series. 
This indicates that the Fama and French model’s risk factors are able to capture the difference 
in performance within top and bottom quintiles. 
The first factor from the model, the CAPM bi(Rm-Rf) confirms the previous finding on the 
volatility (σ) of the top and bottom quintiles: the portfolio constructed on the top quintile 
shows a lower systematic risk than the portfolio constructed on the bottom quintile. 
The second factor from the model, siSMB, represents the “size premium” and  indicates the 
additional return investors have historically received by investing in stocks of companies with 
relatively small market capitalization, given their reduced ability to absorb negative financial 
stock, also explained by their lower degree of diversification which, in turn, increases cash flow 
volatility. The bottom quintile portfolio shows consistently higher value than the top quintile 
portfolio. Because we have included in the sample of diversified firms only diversifiers with a 
sales turnover of at least $500 million, we believe that most of the small capitalization should 
not have been included. This result suggests that diversified firms belonging to the top quintile 
smooth their cash flow and earnings through diversification, indicating a certain degree of 
unrelated business, especially in terms of cash flow correlations or cash flow volatility, hence a 
higher ability to absorb negative financial shock. We also conclude that diversified firms 
belonging to the bottom quintile have a higher relatedness of business segment explained by 
the higher cash flow correlation and volatility. 
The third factor from the model hiHML, represents the “value premium”. The lower coefficients 
found for firms belonging to the top quintile portfolio, compared to the bottom quintile 
portfolio, suggest that firms in the top quintile were able to position their business portfolio 
within industries with higher growth opportunities and higher ROA than firms belonging to the 
bottom quintiles, which seem more focused on mature industries. 
The comparison of the values of (i) the risk and total return, (ii) the Jensen’s alpha, and (iii) the 
HML factor of the Fama and French model confirms that the persistent outstanding 
performance is also present through market-based indicators. It sustains our hypothesis that the 
relationship between diversification and performance is not causal but depends on the ability of 
the firm to remain ahead of the competition (positive abnormal return) or inability of the firm 
to perform at industry averages (negative abnormal return). In addition, the findings related to 
the SMB factors is an indication that firms which belong to the bottom might have a higher 
degree of business relatedness, especially in term of correlation of earning and cash flow, 
hence, to some extent, not confirming the inverted-U relationship between diversification and 
performance. Finally the finding related to the third factors of Fama and French’s asset pricing 
model suggests that diversified firms belonging to the top quintile are able to position their 
portfolio of business segment within industries with higher growth opportunities. 
4.4. Risk measurement: conditional variance 
When the Fama and French asset pricing model is applied to the portfolios returns, we find that 
the investors consider the bottom quintile portfolios more risky than the top quintile portfolios, 
asking for higher return related to the market premium, a size premium, and a value premium.  
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Moreover, the top quintile portfolios have lower risk, measured as the daily standard deviation 
of the distribution of the returns (unconditional variance), 0.091% related to top quintiles, 
compared to 0.010% related to bottom quintiles, as shown in Table VIII. The latter result 
assumes that the returns follow a normal distribution but this is not the case: as can be seen 
from the distribution parameters in Table VIII, normality tests of Kolgomorof-Swirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk reject the hypothesis 0 of normality distribution of portfolio returns during our 
time series 1999-2006: all distributions have a fat tail (kurtosis higher than 3) and, except for 
the bottom quintile of diversified firms (negatively skewed), the other portfolios are positively 
skewed instead of 0, as shown in Figure I. This implies that, in order to assess the risk related to 
the portfolios, it would be more appropriate to use a model of unconditional volatility that 
assumes the non-normality of the return distribution. 
Table VIII 
Distribution and basic statistics of returns 
The table shows the mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, maximum and minimum of 
the daily returns for the top and bottom quintile portfolios. We can see that the distribution of 
returns is not normal: a normal distribution implies zero skewness (symmetric distribution) and 






µ 0.0006211  -0.0000234 
Σ 0.0091273  0.0104531 
Skewness 0.0061088  -0.1537581 
Kurtosis 4.177992  4.83263 
Max 0.0428319  0.0522806 
Min -0.0430556  -0.057147 
Kolgomorof-Swirnov test  11,84*  20,55* 
Shapiro-Wilk test  0,9416*  0,9416* 
* P = 0,001 
 
Figure 1 
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Hence, to compute and compare the risk of top and bottom quintiles, we estimate daily 
conditional variance through the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
model GARCH (1,1) which describes the dynamic behavior of the conditional variance, 
determining its value at each specific time as a function of its value one day before, the value 
of the (squared) innovations one day before, and the long term average variance. The term (1,1) 
indicates that the conditional variance is based on the most recent observation of the squared 
return, and the most recent estimate of the variance rate (both lags = 1). The model is 
represented by the following the formula: 
 
in which ω is the long-term variance γVL (a sort of unconditional variance), γ is the weight 
assigned to the long-term variance, α is the weight of the volatility related to the innovations 
(R
2
t-1 ) of latest news at day t-1, and β is a weight of the previously estimated conditional 
variance σt-1 that represents the persistence of volatility. 
Table VII and Figure 2 show the results. It can be seen that, except for the years 2000 and 2005, 
the daily volatility within the top quintile is lower than the daily volatility within the bottom 
quintile. The term σL representing the long-term volatility (a kind of unconditional volatility) is 
higher for the top quintile than the bottom quintile, (1.21% compared to 1.01%), and we find 
similar results for the parameter α that indicates that the volatility of the top quintile portfolio is 
more sensitive to market news than the volatility of the bottom quintile portfolio (0.088 compared 
to 0.062). By contrast, the term value of the parameter β, which measures the persistence of the 
volatility σ at time (t-1), is higher for bottom quintile (0.905 compared to 0.886). 
Table IX 
Parameters of the daily conditional variance model GARCH (1,1) 
The GARCH (1,1) model describes the dynamic behavior of the conditional variance, determining 
its value at each specific time as a function of its value one day before, the value of the (squared) 
innovations one day before, the long-term average variance and the “leverage effect”. The latter 
effect is explained by the fact that negative returns due to the arrival of bad news increase the 
variance rate more than positive returns of the same magnitude. 
The formula of the conditional variance is: 
 
The term (1,1) indicates that the conditional variance is based on the most recent observation of 
the squared return, and the most recent estimate of the variance rate (both lags = 1). In all cases α 
+ β < 1; this is required for a stable GARCH (1,1). Otherwise, the weight assigned to VL would be 
negative and the process would be mean fleeing rather than mean reverting. 
GARCH (1,1)  Top Quintile  Bottom Quintile 
w*  3.64E-06 3.19E-06 
α*   0.0889629 0.0629463  Parameter Estimates 
β*  0.8861894 0.9058103 
γ  0.0248477 0.00785070 
VL 0.000146492  0.000102093 
σL 0.012103406  0.010104095 
*p< 0.01 
σ t
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Figure 2 













Section V: outstanding performance, efficient internal capital 
market, and degree of relatedness among business segments 
Previous sections have demonstrated that the relationship between diversification and firm 
performance is not causal, but depends on the ability of the firm to persistently perform above 
its industry: some diversified firms persistently reach a performance above their industry peers, 
creating shareholder value and beating the market index. Conversely, other diversified firms are 
persistently unable to achieve similar results: they persistently perform below their industry 
average, have higher market volatility, and perform below the market index. From these results 
we now attempt to quantify the impact on the abnormal return through the main findings in 
strategy and in finance: the degree of relatedness of the business segment within a diversified 
firm and the degree of efficiency of the internal capital market. 
In the field of strategy, the explanation of the relationship between diversification and 
performance is deeply-rooted in the resource-based view of the firm: the degree or relatedness 
among business segments is highly correlated with the ability to develop synergies among 
businesses. Therefore, from this theoretical perspective, there is a positive relationship between 
related diversification and performance. In the field of finance, on the other hand, the main 
justification of the diversification discount among diversified firms is mainly driven by the 
degree of efficiency of the internal capital market: the diversification discount is mainly 
explained by agency costs leading to a misallocation of internal funds from more highly 
profitable business segments to less-profitable business segments.  
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This section attempts to quantify, using panel data, the variation of the dependent variable, 
outstanding ROA (OROA), through the independent variables that represent (i) the degree of 
efficiency of the internal capital market according to the conditions of efficiency identified by 
Shin and Stulz, (1998), and (ii) the degree of the diversified firm’s segments’ relatedness. 
Econometric model selection 
Bergh (1995), Bergh and Holbain (1997), and Bergh (2007) highlighted the relevance of using 
longitudinal studies when attempting to evaluate the relationship between performance and 
degree of business relatedness in order to control for firm-specific effects and 
heteroscedasticity. Hence, the econometrics model used needs to take into account three critical 
considerations: (i) the existence of the time invariant firm’s specific effect ηi as shown in 
section 3 (the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis), (ii) the need to control for 
heteroscedasticity, and (iii) the length of the time series (8 years, 1999-2006) that makes the 
standard candidate in case presence of ηi, (the Within Group indicator) inefficient because of 
the negative correlation of order 1/(t-1) between the transformed lagged dependent variables 
and the transformed error term. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest, for a mean stationary 
process where E[ΔYit  ηi] = 0,  using the  dynamic panel data model using the instrumental 
variables (IV) system’s generalized method of moments (GMM) that eliminates a firm’s specific 
effect and gives an efficient value of parameters for large sample and limited time series. In 
addition, this econometric model allows the researcher to manage the endogeneity related to 
the independent variables with the use of longer lags as instruments when needed. The sample 
selected is composed of large diversified firms with turnover higher than $500 million. Hence, it 
is correct to assume that the delta performance ΔYit of the firms in the sample selected follows 
a mean stationary process. 
Independent variable construction 
Independent variables are developed to represent the efficiency of the internal capital market 
and the degree of relatedness among business segments. 
Efficient internal capital market 
Shin and Stulz (1998) developed three conditions for identifying an efficient internal capital 
market: (i) it gives priority in the allocation of funds to the segments with best investment 
opportunities, (ii) the segment’s investment is less sensitive to its own cash flow as well as to 
the other segments’ cash flow, and (iii) the allocation of funds to a segment falls when other 
segments have better investment opportunities. 
The first and third conditions are directly related to the firm’s performance or, in our case, the 
firm’s outstanding performance; hence the following independent variables are constructed to 
test these two conditions. To test the first condition (the allocation of funds is directed to the 
best performing segments), we developed four dependent variables that are the combination of 
two types of efficient and inefficient investment allocation behaviors of the firm. The first 
behavior is to invest in business segments in which their performance is above (efficient 
investment behavior) or below (inefficient investment behavior) the industry average ROAind. 
The second behavior is to invest in business segments in which their performance is above 
(efficient investment behavior) or below (inefficient investment behavior) the firm’s assets 
weighted ROA. We thus get 4 the dependent variables. The variable MAXMAX, that computes  
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the proportion of (i) investments in segments that perform above industry average ROAind and 
above the firm’s assets weighted ROA, and (ii) disinvestments in segments that perform below 
industry average ROAind and below the firm’s assets weighted ROA. At the opposite end, we 
have the variable MINMIN that computes the proportion of (i) investments in segments that 
perform below industry average ROAind and below the firm’s assets weighted ROA, and (ii) 
disinvestments in segments that perform above industry average ROAind and above the firm’s 
assets weighted ROA. We also construct two intermediate variables MAXMIN and MINMAX. 
MAXMIN computes the proportion of (i) investments in segments that perform above industry 
average ROAind but below the firm’s assets weighted ROA, and (ii) disinvestments in segments 
that perform below industry average ROAind but above the firm’s assets weighted ROA. Finally, 
MINMAX computes the proportion of (i) investments in segments that perform below industry 
average ROAind but above the firm’s assets weighted ROA, and (ii) disinvestments in segments 
that perform above industry average ROAind but below the firm’s assets weighted ROA. 
We therefore construct the four variables as following: 
MAXMAXit = 
where Ijit is the investment in segment j of the firm i in time t of the following formula: 
ASSETjit + DEPRECIATIONjit - ASSETji(t-1) when this sum is >
 0. With the same logic, DISjit is the 
disinvestment when this sum is <
 0. In the denominator is considered the total investments (Iit) 
minus the disinvestments (DISit) of the firm i during time t, given that it aims to represent the 
whole amount of the investment and disinvestment decisions of the firm. Iit is always > 0, DISit 
is always < 0 and, hence, in the formula Iit – DISit is always > 0. This variable measures the 
proportion of efficient investments and disinvestments and, hence, in the numerator is 
considered only the sum of investments and disinvestments within segments that have the ROA 
respectively > ROAind and > the firm’s weighted asset average ROA for investments, and < 
ROAind and < the firm’s weighted asset average ROA for disinvestments. 
According to of Shin and Stulz’s (1998) first condition of internal capital market efficiency, we 
can expect a positive coefficient of MAXMAX (investments in highly performing segments with 
segment ROA both > ROAind and > the firm’s weighted asset average ROA, and disinvestments in 
low performing segments with ROA both < ROAind and < the firm’s weighted asset average ROA) 
and a negative coefficient of MINMIN (investments in low performing segments with segment 
ROA both < ROAind and < the firm’s weighted asset average ROA and disinvestments in high 
performing segments with ROA both > ROAind and > the firm’s weighted asset average ROA). Two 
additional intermediary independent variables are constructed: MAXMIN (investments within 
segments that have the ROA > ROAind but < the firm’s weighted asset average, and disinvestments 
within segments that have the ROA < ROAind but > the firm’s weighted asset average ROA), and 
MINMAX (investments within segments that have the ROA < ROAind but > the firm’s weighted 
asset average ROA, and disinvestments within segments that have the ROA > ROAind but < the 
firm’s weighted asset average ROA). The last two variables have both a positive and negative 
connotation in relation to the first condition of internal capital market efficiency; hence, we do 
not expect a statistically significant sign and value of the coefficients related to MAXMIN and 
MINMAX, but we include it in our econometric models. 
b) To test the third condition of the efficiency of the internal capital market (allocation to a 
specific segment falls when other segments have better investment opportunities), we construct 
the CFINVit  independent variable which always considers the proportion of efficient and 
(I jit + DISjit)
j=1
n
 /(I jit − DISjit) 
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inefficient investment behavior of the firm (investments and disinvestments), but works 
according to a particular condition of efficient internal capital market indicated by the variable 
CFGROWTH. We construct CFINV as follows: 
CFINVit =  
where Ijit is the investment in segment j of the firm i in time t of the following formula: 
ASSETjit + DEPRECIATIONjit - ASSETji(t-1) when this sum is > 0. With the same logic, DISjit is the 
disinvestment when this sum is < 0. In the denominator is considered the total investments (Iit) 
minus the disinvestments (DISit) of the firm i during time t, given that it aims to represent the 
whole amount of the investment and disinvestment decisions of the firm. Iit is always > 0, DISit 
is always < 0 and, hence, in the formula Iit – DISit is always > 0. CFINVit works according to the 
logic described by the variable CFGROWTHjit that captures the relative performance of each 
segment in comparison with the rest of the firm’s business segment portfolio. 
CFGROWTHjit =  
and it behaves according to the following logic: 
•  if CFGROWTHjit > 0 than we compute Ijit according to its formula in CFINVit 
•  if CFGROWTHjit < 0 and (ASSETjit + DEPRECIATIONjit - ASSETji(t-1)) < 0 we are in a 
situation of an “efficient” disinvestment, hence we compute the disinvestment amount 
DISjit according to its formula in CFINVit 
•  if CFGROWTHjit < 0 and and (ASSETjit + DEPRECIATIONjit - ASSETji(t-1)) > 0 we are in a 
situation of an “inefficient” investment, hence we set the investment Ijit to 0  
CFGROWTH takes into consideration whether investment and disinvestment decisions are 
efficient, so CFGROWTH > 0 indicates that an investment has been performed because the 
profitability of the segment j under the formula   is higher than 
the rest of the portfolio -j under the formula    When 
CFGROWTH < 0 then we have two sub-cases: if (ASSETjit + DEPRECIATIONjit - ASSETji(t-1)) < 0 
the internal capital market is efficient because a disinvestment has been performed given that 
the profitability of the segment j is lower than the rest of the firm’s business segment portfolio 
-j. In the second case, when (ASSETjit + DEPRECIATIONjit - ASSETji(t-1)) > 0 the internal capital 
market is inefficient because an investment has been performed in segment j although the 
profitability of this segment is lower than the rest of the firm’s business segment portfolio -j, 
hence we set the value of the investment Ijit to 0. 
CFjit is the cash flow (the sum of the operating profit plus depreciations) of the segment j of firm i 
during time t, CF-jit represents the total cash flow (the sum of the operating profit plus 
depreciations) of the segments of the firm minus the segment j. Ajit is the value of the assets 
allocated to the segment j of firm i during time t and A-jit is the value of the assets allocated to all 
segments except segment j of firm i during time t and finally and (t-1) represents one lag period. 
According to Shin and Stulz’s (1998) third condition of internal capital market efficiency, the 
value of CFINVit varies from value 1 (100% of the investment and disinvestment decisions are 
(I jit + DISjit)
j=1
n
 /(I jit − DISjit)
   




   




   
(CFjit / Ajit)/(CFji(t−1) / Aji(t−1)) 
 











efficient) to value 0 (0% of the investment and disinvestment decisions are efficient). Overall it 
is expected to have a positive coefficient between the independent variable CFINVit and the 
dependent variable OROA. 
Degree of segment relatedness 
Here, in order to assess the validity of the inverted-U curvilinear relationship between 
diversification and performance (Markides and Williamson, 1994; Palich, Cardinal, and Miller, 
2000), we prefer not to use sophisticated indicators of relatedness; while they would certainly 
be able to tap into the degree of relatedness among business segments, they may also invoke a 
certain degree of subjectivity (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). Hence the following indicators will be 
used: (i) Herfindahl index, (ii) simple count-of-industry approach, and (iii) entropy indicators 
(Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Papelu, 1985). An additional argument for not using sophisticated 
indicators of relatedness is also motivated by the time series selection and by the use of the 
NAICS codification. In the time series selected (1999–2006), segment information is disclosed 
according to the new segment reporting standard SFAS 131, in which firms need to report 
disaggregated information by line of business unless they organize themselves that way for the 
purposes of performance evaluation. This induces companies to more fully reveal their 
diversification and fund transfer strategies. Moreover the information provided under the new 
segment definition standard would be less subjective than what was provided under the 
previous SFAS 14 (Berger and Hann, 2003). Thus, the use of the NAICS codification rather than 
the SIC codification allows to capture a certain portion of the degree of relatedness among 
business segments because of their construction logic. 
The indicators are: 
HERFINDAHL INDEXit = 1-  where S = SALESjit/ 
DTit (Diversification Total entropy indicator of firm i in time t) =  
where Pj is the proportion of business (sales) of segment j defined by the 6-digit NAICS code. 
DUit (Diversification Unrelated entropy indicator of firm i in time t) =   where 
Sj is the proportion of business (sales) of segments j defined according to the first 3 digits of the 
NAICS code. 
DRit (Diversification Related entropy indicator of firm i in time t) = DTit - DUit 
NBSEGit = Number of segments reported by firm i in time t. 
NBSECit = Number of subsectors defined by the first 3 digits of the NAICS code of firm i in time t. 
NBINDit = Number of industries defined by the first 4 digits of the NAICS code of firm i in time t. 
Moreover, we control the effects for the firm leverage and for firm sizes that are considered 
affecting firm’s performance with diversified firms (Lewellen, 1971: Mansi and Reeb, 2002: 
Chandler, 1977). We therefore introduce two control variables: (LEVERAGE) that represents the 
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The results of the instrumental variables (IV) system GMM dynamic panel data econometric 
models are shown in table X. 
Table X 
Instrumental variable (IV) system GMM econometric models results 
Model 1 and 2 are oriented toward the degree of efficiency of the internal capital market with 
instruments with lag (t-2) for the fund allocation independent variables on variable given the 
presence of the firm’s specific effect ηi. Model (3) to (5) are oriented toward the test of the 
degree relatedness with the performance. Also here the lag (t-2) is taken into consideration 
given the presence of the firm’s specific effect ηi. Instrument with lag (t-3) is taken for the 
variable Yi(t-1) to obtain satisfying results of the Sargan test. The Sargan test and the Hansen 
tests confirm the orthogonality restrictions of the instruments used, hence reliable instruments 
are used. The Arellano Bond test confirms the absence of first order and second order 
correlation in the residuals. All models control for heteroskedasticity and the t statistics of the 
coefficients are indicated in brackets. 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
OROA (t-3)  0.6660*  (10.33) 0.6863* (10.53) 0.6164* (7.81) 0.5460*  (7.18) 0.5887* (7.72) 
MAXMAX (t-2)  0.0313*  (3.08) 0.0343*  (2.94)  0.0198  (1.45)  0.0345*  (3.03)  0.04215* (3.38) 
MAXMIN (t-2)  -0.0035   (-1.21)  -0.0036   (-1.15)      
MINMAX (t-2)  0.0063   (0.98) 0.0073      (1.03)      
MINMIN (t-2)  -0.0044 (0.62) -0.0051  (0.70)      
CFINV (t-2)  0.0167** (1.88)  0.0147** (1.75)       
LEVERAGE (t-2)  -0.0004 (-0.67)       
LOGASSETS (log) (t-2)  -0.0257**  (-1.75)  -0.0280 (-1.78)    -0.0316** (1.79)  -0.0375* (1.99) 
HERFINDAHL INDEX (t-2)  0.0001 (0.83)         
DT (t-2)        -0.0032 (-0.29)   
DU (t-2)          0.0019 (0.29) 
DR (t-2)          0.0111 (0.65) 
NBSEG (6 digits NAICS code) (t-2)      -0.076* (1.98)  -0.0192 (-0.43)   
NBSEC (3digits NAICS code) (t-2)      0.0204* (2.03)     
NBIND (4 digits NAICS code) (t-2)        0.0192* (2.31)   
Sargan test  0.616  0.494  0.161  0.192  0. 151 
Hansen test  0.297  0.175  0.298  0.631  0. 614 
Arellano Bond residual AR(1)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Arellano Bond residual AR(2)  0.015  0.018  0.044  0.020  0.025 
*P < 0.001 ** P < 0 
 
All 5 models confirm a strong persistence of outstanding performance based on the outstanding 
ROA (OROA) indicator through coefficient βYit-1  within the range 0.54 to 0.68 as found in 
section III. We confirm the two efficient internal capital market conditions (Shin and Stulz’s 
(1998): positive abnormal returns are explained by the degree of efficiency of the internal 
capital markets. The coefficients βi  for the independent variable MAXMAX and CFINV are 
positive and statistically significant, within the ranges 0.0421 to 0.031 and 0.0167 to 0.0147 
respectively. We do not find an inverted-U curvilinear relationship between diversification and 
performance as assumed in the literature in strategic management. Rather, we find the opposite 
results: the coefficients βi related to the independent variables NBSEC and NBIND are positive  
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and statistically significant, within the range 0.0204 to 0.0192. The coefficient related to 
NBSEG has a negative value of -0.076. We also notice that entropy indexes and the Herfindahl 
index do not reach statistical significance. 
We conclude, therefore, that past outstanding performance or past relative performance remains 
the variable with the greatest explanatory power of the persistence of abnormal return within 
diversified firms. 
For all models, the values of the Sargan and Hansen tests, as well as the Arellano Bond 
autoregression test AR(1) and AR(2) of the residuals (absent for both AR(1) and AR (2)), confirm 
the statistical validity of the econometric models. Moreover, all models control for 
heteroscedasticity. 
Our results confirm our assumption that the relationship between diversification and firm 
performance is not causal but depends on the ability of the firm to position itself ahead its 
competitors (positive abnormal return) or inability to perform at industry average level 
(negative abnormal return). We also confirm the main assumption in the finance literature 
regarding the benefits related to the internal capital market. But comparing the value the 
coefficient βi related to the degree of internal capital market efficiency with the coefficient 
related to the past abnormal return, we notice as expected that the latter indicator has a much 
higher contribution than the former. We affirm therefore that the relationship between 
diversification and performance is more sophisticated than simply efficiently managing the 
capital budgeting process within diversified firms, allocating funds to best performing business 
segments. However, we do not confirm the main assumption in strategic management. We find 
that business relatedness is negatively related with firm performance. This evidence is also 
confirmed by the combination of the negative sign of the coefficient of the independent 
variable NBSEG (number of business segments of the firm) with the positive sign of the 
coefficients related the number of subsectors and number of industry (NBSEG AND NBIND 
defined by the 3- and 4-digit NAICS codes, respectively). This combination effectively captures 
the business portfolio of a “highly related” diversified firm: a highly related diversified firm has  
a “high” number of segments (NBSEG high) but a low number of subsectors and industry 
defined at 3 or 4 NAICS digits code. From our results this combination is negatively related 
with the firm’s abnormal return. To strengthen our conclusions we reiterate that, according the 
new segment reporting standard SFAS 131 of June 1997, firms need to report disaggregated 
information by line of business unless they organize themselves that way for the purposes of 
performance evaluation. It induces companies to more fully reveal their diversification and 
funds transfer strategies, hence reflecting any underlying agency problem (Berger and Hann, 
2003). Finally, this result is also confirmed when we regressed the upper and lower quintile of 
diversified firms to the SMB factors of Fama and French’s three factor model. 
Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004a), argue that the “diversification discount” is 
mainly driven by endogeneity in which poorly performing firms choose a related diversification 
strategy as a safe way to move away from a declining industry, hence they still perform poorly. 
This would certainly help to explain the negative relationship between related diversification 
and firm performance. This is why we interpret our result as a testament of correlation and not 
causation. Following this line of thought we can explain the positive relationship between 
unrelated diversification and firm performance.  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 27 
Section VI: conclusion and future research 
We study the relationship between diversification and firm performance according to the main 
empirical findings in strategy and finance but controlling for the persistence of abnormal 
returns. We conclude that this relationship is not causal but attributable to factors other than 
the degree of relatedness among business units and the degree of internal capital market 
efficiency, which have a statistically significant contribution but a marginal explanatory power 
to explain the persistence of positive or negative abnormal return. The persistence of abnormal 
returns has a grater explanatory power: some diversified firms (top quintile) consistently create 
shareholder value, beat the market index and have lower market volatility, while the opposite 
holds true for the bottom quintile of diversified firms. 
We confirm that top performers efficiently manage their internal capital markets but we find a 
negative relationship between diversification and performance: related diversified firms are 
associated with lower performance. 
Our results clearly confirm that the positive relationship between diversification and performance 
goes far beyond the simple explanation of an efficient internal capital market or a certain degree 
of relatedness among business segments. Our results suggest that, in order to study the 
relationship between diversification and performance, more complete models including firm’s 
strategies and management skills, for example, should be also taken into consideration.  
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